Formation of Cooper Pairs as a Consequence of Exchange Interaction

Analyzing the exchange energy of two conduction electrons in a crystal at many-body approach we find that the exchange energy may be negative and, thus, the singlet state may be favorable. A full overlap in the real space of the wave functions of two conduction electrons leads to a deeper exchange energy. Thus the exchange interaction causes a bond between two conduction electrons in the real space. The singlet bond is possible because the singlet electrons are in average closer to positive ions than single electrons. If conduction electrons, before the pairing, are put on the Fermi surface in the momentum space, then every pair may exist permanently in time. The motion of conduction electrons in the crystal may prevent the formation of Cooper pairs, because the kinetic energy of the motion is usually larger than the binding energy in the pair. Conduction electrons as standing waves have zero momenta, hence their momenta are synchronous; therefore the formation of Cooper pairs is more probable than in case of non-zero momenta. The approach of standing waves explains the inverse isotope effect and many other facts about superconductors. Considering the electronic pairs as bosons we find that a further necessary condition for superconductivity is a non-zero temperature of the Bose-Einstein-Condensation.Comment: added explanation about spectrum width of paired electron

Insider Trading, Informed Trading, and Market Making: Liquidity of Securities Markets in the Zero-Sum Game

This Article reexamines the nexus of relationships among informed transactions, information asymmetry, and liquidity of securities markets in the context of public policy debates about insider trading and its regulation.The Article analyzes this nexus, with the emphasis on recent empirical studies and developments in the securities industry, from a variety of perspectives and considers the validity of the alleged link between insider trading—as opposed to other forms of informed trading—and market liquidity as a justification for the existence of regulation

Insider Trading, Informed Trading, and Market Making: Liquidity of Securities Markets in the Zero-Sum Game

This Article reexamines the nexus of relationships among informed transactions, information asymmetry, and liquidity of securities markets in the context of public policy debates about insider trading and its regulation.The Article analyzes this nexus, with the emphasis on recent empirical studies and developments in the securities industry, from a variety of perspectives and considers the validity of the alleged link between insider trading—as opposed to other forms of informed trading—and market liquidity as a justification for the existence of regulation

Securities Fraud Embedded in the Market Structure Crisis: High-Frequency Traders as Primary Violators

This Article analyzes approaches to attaching liability for securities fraud to high-frequency traders as primary violators in connection with the current market structure crisis. One of the manifestations of this crisis pertains to inadequate disclosure of advanced functionalities offered by trading venues, as exemplified by the order type controversy. The Article’s analysis is applied to secret arrangements between trading venues and preferred traders, glitches and gaming, and the reach of the doctrine of market manipulation, and several relevant issues are also viewed from the standpoint of the integrity of the trading process. The Article concludes by arguing for a balanced approach to catching certain problematic practices of high-frequency traders as securities fraud